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of-use#LAACAN YOU WATCH UNENUMERATED  RIGHTS DRIFT?
Mark Tushnd
By  this point  in  the  Symposium,  observers  will  have  noticed  the
obvious;  there is  no category  unenumerated rights.  Indeed, there can-
not be such a category if we think that an analytic category must have
some  reasonably  stable  content.  The  whole  point  of the  so-called
category  is to  give  us a  conceptual  tool to  use  when  thinking about
rights  that  you  can't  find  anywhere  else,  no  matter  how  hard you
look.  But, if you can't find them anywhere  else, it's not entirely clear
what  "they" might be.  Or, more  precisely,  anythin  can count  as an
unenumerated  right.  Consider  Bowers v.  Hardwick  and  Lawrence v.
Texas.2  Justice  Byron White was  surely correct in  asserting that there
is no enumerated  right to homosexual  sodomy in  the  Constitution ,
but Justice  Anthony  Kennedy  was  equally  correct  in  asserting  that
there was an enumerated right to liberty in the Constitution.4
What, then, might we think about when dealing with the category
unenumerated rights?  We  could  begin  by  observing  that  the  term  is
used in  constitutional  discourse  by,  as  the  phrase  goes,  competent
speakers.  What we might do, then, is try to figure out what the term
is doing in  that discourse, not in the sense,  "why on earth are they us-
ing that term?"  but in a sense more like, "what are they getting out of
using it?"
5  People  will  go about answering  such  a question  in  their
own ways,  and I do not contend that mine is the only correct one, but
for me the sensible  approach  to an answer  comes through  historical
and political analysis.  In  this short essay I  do not plan to provide an
extensive  genealogy  of the  term  unenumerated rights, but will  instead
be more allusive than comprehensive.
William  Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
478 U.S.  186 (1986)  (5-4 decision),  overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558  (2003).
2  539 U.S. 558  (2003).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194  (describing the claim as  "having little or no cognizable roots in  the
language or design  of the Constitution").
4 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564  (referring to "liberty under  the Due  Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment").  This is enumerated at least in  a sense, as I  discuss below in  Part II.
I  am  here  resisting  a formulation  of the sort, "what functions  does the  term  perform?"
because  that formulation  suggests at  least a more instrumentalist approach  to the matter than
seems appropriate  to me.JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW
At first I  thought that this essay would  deal with what Jack  Balkin
has  called  "ideological  drift." 6  Ideological  drift  occurs  when  a  legal
concept  like freedom  of speech  starts  out with  a particular  political
valence  and then comes  to have  a substantially  different political  va-
lence.  The  case of free speech  provides  seemingly the easiest exam-
ple  of ideological  drift.  From  the  1920s  to  the  1970s  or so, liberals
typically  supported  challenges  to  speech regulations  because,  taking
all the possible occasions of regulation into account, liberals believed
that, on balance,  governments  would  try to suppress  liberal  or leftist
expression  more  than  they  would  try  to  suppress  conservative  or
right-wing expression.7  Since  then, though,  free speech  has  become
conservatives' darling.8  They have used  it in the  culture  wars  to chal-
lenge  hate speech  regulation  and antidiscrimination  laws. 9  And,  as
perceptive  observers understood  early on, it has become  the modern
substitute for substantive due process as the constitutional vehicle for
challenging economic regulations.0
I had initially thought  that I  would  describe  a similar ideological
drift  in  the  idea  of unenumerated  rights.  The  story would  be  the
same;  unenumerated  rights used to  be the  province  of liberals,  par-
ticularly with respect to privacy and individual autonomy, but has now
become  the  province  of conservatives.  The  most  obvious  examples
come  from  the  Supreme  Court's  punitive  damages  decisions,  but
most  of the  contemporary  Court's  federalism  decisions,  along  with
aspects  of  its  regulatory  takings  doctrine,  involve  the  judicial  en-
forcement of unenumerated rights.
These  cases suggest  that unenumerated  rights  have  drifted from
the left to the right.  On reflection,  though, I have become  less confi-
dent about that  statement.  The  reason arises  from  the  proposition
6  See,  e.g., J.M.  Balkin,  Ideological  Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25  CONN.  L. REV.  869,
870 (1993).
7  Cf MICHAEL KENT CURTIS,  FREE SPEECH, "THE  PEOPLE'S  DARLING  PRIVILEGE":  STRUGGLES
FOR FREEDOM  OF  EXPRESSION  IN  AMERICAN  HISTORY  389-402  (2000)  (tracking the  Court's  rul-
ings regarding political speech during the mid-twentieth century).
8  Cf  id. at  431-32  ("Today,  some justify  limiting speech  by appealing  to concepts  such
as...  the idea that core constitutional  values  make certain  messages illegitimate....  Ironically,
suppression  theories advocated by modern critics  resemble historical rationales  for limiting an-
tislavery speech.").
9  See, e.g.,  Boy Scouts of Am. v.  Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644  (2000)  (5-4 decision)  (holding that a
public  accommodations  law  requiring  Boy  Scouts  of America  to admit  homosexual  members
violated the organization's First Amendment  rights);  R.A.V. v. City of St.  Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381
(1992)  (ruling unconstitutional on free speech grounds an ordinance  against placing  hate sym-
bols  on private  property).  Dale actually invoked a right of "expressive  association"  related to,
but distinct from,  the  right of free expression  and,  to that extent,  might itself be taken  as  an
example of a conservative  use of an unenumerated ight.  530 U.S. at 648.
10 See Thomas  H. Jackson  & John  Calvin Jeffries, Jr.,  Commercial Speech:  Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment,  65 VA.  L. REV.  1, 4-5  (1979)  (critiquing a case  in which  the Supreme
Court found business advertising to be protected speech).
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that, for a legal  concept  to drift from  left to  right or right to  left,  it
had to have been somewhere  in the first place.  And it is not clear to
me  that  unenumerated  rights-and,  indeed,  any rights-ever  were
located  anywhere  on the  political  spectrum.  By  this I  do not mean
that the domain of rights exists somewhere  above  or independent  of
politics.  Rather,  I  mean  to  make  three  points.  First, and  perhaps
least  interesting,  everyone,  right  and  left,  believes  that  the  courts
should  enforce  unenumerated  rights.  They  simply  disagree  about
which  such  rights  the  courts should  enforce.  Second,  as  noted  ear-
lier, it may be that no rights are enumerated in any interesting sense.
At the point of application  or specification,  constitutional  text disap-
pears and something else takes  its place.  And third, as a result of the
first  two  points, unenumerated  rights  are  always  everywhere  on  the
political spectrum.  The category certainly cannot drift and, I believe,
neither can any particular right within the category.
This essay proceeds by elaborating on those three points.
I.  CATALOGUING  UNENUMERATED  RIGHTS
Here  I  enumerate  unenumerated  rights,  with  an  initial  effort  at
locating them on the political spectrum.  The discussion will be brief,
because  other articles  in  this Symposium  provide  the  particulars  in
ways that  need no repetition  here.  My  aim here  is to show that un-
enumerated  rights have  been, and are, used in the  service  of conser-
vative  as  well  as  liberal  goals-and to resist a  narrative  in which  un-
enumerated  rights were  once the  property  of conservatives,  became
the property of liberals, and have  become the property of both.
A.  On the Left
The liberal versions of unenumerated rights are well-known.  Con-
sider  this  list, offered  by James  Fleming  as  a  positive  description  of
unenumerated  rights recognized in contemporary  U.S. constitutional
law:
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought
freedom  of association,  including  both  expressive  association  and  inti-
mate association, whatever one's sexual orientation
the right to live with one's family, whether nuclear or extended
the right to travel or relocate
the right to marry
the  right  to  decide  whether  to  bear  or  beget  children,  including  the
rights to procreate,  to use contraceptives, and to terminate a pregnancy
the right to direct the education and rearing of children
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the right  to  exercise  dominion  over one's body,  including  the  right  to
bodily integrity and ultimately the right to die.1'
Two  issues leap  out upon  reading  this  list.  First,  why eight unenu-
merated rights and not ten or fifteen  (if we were to break out some of
the  clauses  into  separate  rights),  or one  or  two  (if we  were  to  sub-
sume some  items  into others)?  Precisely  because  the  rights are  not
differentiated  in  some  authoritative  text,  unenumerated  rights  can
proliferate or disappear, making it hard to watch them over time.
Second, and more interesting,  even describing these rights as un-
enumerated  is problematic.  For all the criticism he has taken, Justice
William  Douglas  tied the right to privacy  in  Griswold v.  Connecticut to
several  constitutional  provisions.
1 2   The  Court  in  Roe  v.  Wade"  and
Lawrence located  the  right to  autonomy  in the  Due Process  Clause,
14
and-again  despite John Hart Ely's well-known  derisive comment on
the very  idea  of substantive  due  process  -the  proposition  that the
Due  Process  Clause  protects  against  substantively  arbitrary  govern-
ment actions  goes back a long  way, indeed  to the  Clause's origins  in
the  Magna  Carta. 6  And,  if you  do  not think  that  is  good  enough,
consider the  proposition  that the  right can  readily  be rooted  in the
Privileges  or Immunities  Clause, 7  a  text that was  unavailable  to  the
Court  in  Roe  only  because  of  the  mistaken  earlier  decision  in  the
Slaughter-House Cases.1 8  The right of expressive  association  might be
rooted  in the  First Amendment,' 9 as could liberty of conscience  and
freedom of thought.0
Even at the start, then, calling something an unenumerated  right
seems  problematic.  Those  who  believe  a  particular  right  deserves
protection by means of judicial enforcement  might accept the charac-
1  JAMES  E. FLEMING,  SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL  DEMOCRACY:  THE  CASE  OF AUTONOMY  91
(2006).
12 See  381  U.S.  479,  484  (1965)  (describing  the  various  guarantees  in  the  Constitution's
amendments  that produce  an implicit privacy  right).  For defenses  of Justice Douglas's textual-
ism in  Griswold, see  David Luban,  The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARv.  C.R.-C.L.
L.  REV.  7,  31-32  (1999),  and Mark Tushnet,  Two  Notes on the Jurisprudence of Privacy, 8  CONST.
COMMENT.  75,  75 (1991).
13 410 U.S. 113  (1973).
14  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §  1, cl.  3.
15  JOHN  HART  ELY,  DEMOCRACY  AND  DISTRUST:  A  THEORY  OF JUDICIAL  REVIEW  18  (1980)
("'[S] ubstantive  due process'  is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness.'").
16  SeeJOHN V. ORTH,  DUE PROCESS OF LAW:  A BRIEF HISTORY 7  (2003)  (describing the Magna
Carta's influence on development of constitutional due process fights).
17  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.  2.
18  83 U.S.  (16'Wall.)  36 (1870).
19  See NAACP  v. Alabama  ex rel. Patterson,  357 U.S. 449, 460  (1958)  (describing the fight of
association  as closely related to the enumerated freedoms  of speech and assembly).
20  For a discussion  of the connection  between  freedom  of conscience  and religious  liberty,
see Rodney  K. Smith,  Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute with a Little  "Con-
science,"  1996 BYU L. REV.  645,  649 (arguing for a statute linking "conscience" and religious lib-
erty).
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terization  of their favored  right as unenumerated,  but they need not
do so:  texts are available for pretty much everything-and  maybe the
qualification  is unnecessary.  To use Frank Michelman's terminology,
perhaps there are  no rights outside  the domain identified  by the use
of "standard legal methods,
2'  because  those methods  are so eclectic,
flexible,  and accommodating  that a good lawyer can use  them  to ex-
plain how any particular right is compatible with the law as it is.2 2
B.  On the Right
The  conservative  catalogue  of protected  unenumerated  rights  is
newer but by now familiar.  The clearest case is BMW of North America,
Inc. v.  Gore, in which  the Court held that excessive punitive  damages
violated the  Due Process  Clause.3  Having rejected  arguments based
on  the textual  Excessive  Fines Clause 4 and procedural due  process,
the  Court majority  was  left only with substantive  due  process,  as Jus-
tice  Antonin  Scalia  pointed  out.
6  The  subsequent  decision  in State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v.  Campbell gives ample  fuel  to critics
of the judicial enforcement  of unenumerated  rights who worry that,
in doing so, judges simply make things up. v  There  the majority held
that  punitive  damages  in  excess  of ten  times  actual  damages  were
presumptively unconstitutional.
Even Justice Scalia has sometimes  bought into the enforcement of
unenumerated  rights,  though.  Writing  for  the  Court  in  Printz v.
United  States, Justice  Scalia  enforced  a  principle  barring  Congress
from  "commandeering"  the  legislative  or  executive  apparatuses  of
state government  to perform  national tasks.29  Justice Scalia  acknowl-
edged  that "there  is  no  constitutional  text speaking  to  this  precise
21 Frank I.  Michelman,  Unenumerated  Rights Under Popular  Constitutionalism,  9 U.  PA.J. CONST.
L.  121,  126 (2006).
22  For additional  discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 38-46.
23  517 U.S. 559, 562, 568  (1996)  (5-4  decision).  But cf. Benjamin  C. Zipursky, A  Theory of Pu-
nitive Damages, 84  TEX.  L.  REV.  105,  121  (2005)  (observing  that  Gore "appears  to be  textually
untethered").
24 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.,  Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.  257, 280 (1989)  (reject-
ing an Excessive  Fines Clause challenge to punitive damages);  cf  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl.  2
("[E]xcessive fines  [shall not be]  imposed.").
25 Pac.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Haslip,  499  U.S.  1, 23-24  (1991)  (rejecting  a procedural  due
process challenge).
26 Gore, 517  U.S. at 600-02  (Scalia, J., dissenting);  see also Zipursky, supra note 23, at  110-29
(describing the Court's path in evaluating  the punitive damages question).
27  538 U.S. 408 (2003).
28  Id.  at  425  ("Our  jurisprudence  and  the  principles  it  has  now  established  demon-
strate..,  that, in practice, few  awards exceeding a single-digit ratio  between punitive  and com-
pensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.").
521  U.S. 898, 925, 935 (1997).
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question.'' o In other contexts that observation would have led him to
end the  opinion immediately.  Instead, he went on  to find what can
only  be  called  an  unenumerated  right  for  states  to  be  free  from
commandeering.
The  same  can  be  said  of the  Court's jurisprudence  immunizing
state  governments  from  monetary  liability  for their violations  of na-
tional  law.  Initially Justice  Scalia  worried  that  such  an  immunity
could not be justified on textual grounds. 3'  Eventually he came to the
view  that  the  immunity  rested  on constitutional  structure  and  pre-
suppositions. 3
'  And, when the Court enforced  this immunity against
33 suit  in  state  courts,  the  disconnection  between  text  and  right  was
transparent.
As with  the unenumerated rights  liberals invoke,  these rights find
their  justification  in  constitutional  structure  and  presuppositions.
For conservatives,  the structure  is one of federalism, for liberals,  one
of individual  liberty; for conservatives,  the  presupposition  is that the
national government  has limited powers, for liberals, that all govern-
ments  must  avoid  arbitrary  infringements  on fundamental  liberties.
But the structure of the constitutional right is similar.
Even the regulatory  takings doctrine  is only loosely tied to consti-
tutional text.  True, the Fifth Amendment refers  to takings of private
property.  But, as scholars  have demonstrated, it is  about as clear as
these  things get that in the founding era, a "taking" was what we  now
know as a permanent physical occupation,  not a regulatory restriction
on  a  property  owner's use  of his  property. 3 5  When confronted  with
30 Id. at 905.
31  Welch  v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp.,  483 U.S. 468, 495-96  (1987)  (plurality)
(ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  The reason  is that the only text
bearing on  the issue,  the  Eleventh Amendment,  clearly  provides  immunity only  against  suits
brought against a state by those who are not its own citizens.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XI  ("The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States  by Citizens of another State,  or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign  State.").
See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid  Postsecondary Educ.  Expense Bd.,  527 U.S. 666, 669-70
(1999)  (Scalia, J.)  ("Though  its precise  terms  bar only...  suits  brought against  one State  by
citizens of another State..., we have long recognized  that the Eleventh Amendment  [restored]
the sovereign immunity that the States possessed before entering the Union.").
3  SeeAlden  v. Maine,  527 U.S.  706, 758-60  (1999)  (Kennedy,J.).
See U.S.  CONST.  amend.  V,  cl.  5  ("[N]or shall  private  property  be  taken  for public  use,
without just compensation.").
See John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original  Meaning of the Takings
Clause, 94 Nw.  U.  L. REV.  1099,  1101  (1999)  (arguing "that the  Takings  Clause  was originally
understood  as  referring only to appropriation");  William  Michael  Treanor,  The  Original  Under-
standing of the  Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95  COLUM.  L.  REV.  782,  782  (1995)  ("The
Clause  required  compensation when  the  federal government  physically  took  private  property,
but not when government regulations  limited the ways in which property could  be used.").  But
see Eric R. Claeys,  Takings, Regulations, and Natural  Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1553
(2003)  (arguing  that the  natural  rights  philosophy  prevalent  at  the  founding  informed  the
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this  evidence, Justice  Scalia,  for  the  Court, wrote  a footnote  saying
that, whatever  was  true  at the  founding, by the  time the  Fourteenth
Amendment was  adopted and certainly  by today, the  concept of tak-
ing had expanded to include regulatory takings.36  Treating regulatory
takings  as  within  the  category  of  constitutional  takings  reflects  a
modernist  conception  of property,  and  to that extent the  regulatory
takings doctrine protects a right not enumerated  in the original text.
Here  we  have  the  first  reason  why unenumerated  rights  cannot
drift from  left or right, or otherwise:  For something  to drift, it first
has  to be  somewhere,  and then  later somewhere  else.  But, because
people located at all points on the political spectrum  want the courts
to  enforce  unenumerated  rights,  the  category  is  already  spread  out
across that spectrum.  The reason, once  again, is  that standard legal
methods are accommodating indeed.
II.  How ALL RIGHTS ARE EQUALLY ENUMERATED  OR UNENUMERATED
The fact  that the judges who  decided  the  cases  I  have  described
did not think that they were simply making things up suggests the dif-
ficulty with the term  unenumerated  rights. As far as  I am aware, no one
advocates  enforcing  truly  unenumerated  rights,  that  is,  rights  that
have no connection whatever  to the Constitution's text.  Saying that a
decision  enforces an unenumerated  right is sometimes simply  to dis-
parage  the  decision  as  entirely groundless,  or, as Justice  White  sug-
gested, perhaps  only to  disparage  a claim as  among the weakest  pos- 31
sible  within  our system.  To  that extent,  we  have  an answer  to  the
founders'  understanding  of property  in  a  way  that makes  a  regulatory  takings doctrine  com-
patible with  their understanding).
36 Justice  Scalia  used the  note  to  expand on  his  point that the  understanding  of Takings
Clause compact has changed and "become part of our constitutional culture":
Justice Blackmun  expends a good deal of throw-weight of his own upon a noncombatant,
arguing that our description  of the "understanding" of land ownership that informs the
Takings  Clause is not supported  by early American  experience.  That is largely true, but
entirely  irrelevant.  The practices  of the States prior to incorporation  of the Takings and
Just Compensation  Clauses.  . . were out of accord with any plausible  interpretation of
those  provisions.  Justice  Blackmun  is correct that early constitutional  theorists did not
believe the Takings Clause embraced  regulations of property at all, but even he does not
suggest  (explicitly, at least)  that we renounce the  Court's contrary conclusion  in Mahon.
Since  the text of the Clause can be read  to encompass regulatory as well  as physical dep-
rivations ....  we decline to do so as well.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.  1003,  1028 & n.15  (1992)  (references omitted).
37  See Bowers v. Hardwick,  478 U.S. 186,  194 (1986),  overruled ly Lawrence  v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003)  ("The Court is  most vulnerable and comes nearest  to illegitimacy when it deals  with
judge-made  constitutional  law having little or no cognizable roots in  the language  or design  of
the Constitution.").
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question,  "what are they doing when they use the term?"  The answer
is  that  they  are  criticizing  or jeering  or  insulting  the  decision  or
claim.  In this aspect, unenumerated  right is a term of abuse.
Somewhat  less  disparagingly,  saying  that  a  decision  enforces  an
unenumerated  right  might  mean  that  the  connection  between  the
right enforced  and the  Constitution's  text  is  not  strong  enough.
Then,  though,  it would  be  nice  to  have  some  coherent account  of
how we  know when a connection  is strong enough.  Here is another
take on this point:  Return  to the dispute between Justices White  and
Kennedy  over  whether  there  is  an  enumerated  right  that  protects
gays'  sexual  activities; the former says there is no enumerated right to
engage  in homosexual  activities,  the  latter that there  is a right to be
free from arbitrary restrictions on fundamental  interests.  The exam-
ple  could be  repeated:  there  is an enumerated right  to freedom  of
speech  but no enumerated  right to  freedom  to impose  reputational
harm  on others  by distributing false  statements  about them, there  is
an enumerated  right  to equal  treatment under  the law but  no  enu-
merated  right to  have  government decisions made without regard  to
race, and on and on.  In one sense, then, questions about unenumer-
ated rights  are  questions about the  level of abstraction  on which  we
are to understand constitutional language.  And, I think, scholars and
judges have established that there is no analytic basis for selecting one
rather than another level of generality or specificity.
38
We  can  see  this  point in  a  common  critical  rhetoric  about  Su-
preme  Court decisions.  In the context of unenumerated  rights, the
rhetoric is embodied in the demand;  show me the  place in the Con-
stitution where you find the right to privacy--or  the right to an abor-
tion-located.  But,  exactly the  same  rhetoric  is available,  and used,
when the Court makes a controversial decision that it ties to constitu-
tional  text:  "You  say  that the  Constitution  protects  nude  dancing.
Where  does  it  say  that?"  And,  of course,  the  answer,  "in  the  First
Amendment,"  is  inadequate,  at  least  to  the  critical  questioner,  be-
cause  she  will  respond,  "but how  is  dancing-wordless,  after  all-
'speech"'?  At  that point,  the  discussion  gets  into  considerations  of
free  speech theory, precedent, and the like-precisely what happens
when the Court enforces what its critics describe  as an unenumerated
right.
Justice Scalia's observation in Printz that "there is no constitutional
text speaking  to this precise question '
,39  is universally true.  The  reason is that all constitutional  provisions  are  written  on  a  reasonably high
For the classic  discussion, see Laurence H.  Tribe & Michael  C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in
the Definition  of Rights, 57 U. CHI.  L. REv.  1057,  1058 (1990)  ("The selection of a level  of general-
ity necessarily involves value choices.").
39 Printz v. United States, 521  U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
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level of abstraction,  as they must be for the document  to be a consti-
tution.
4
0  During the  confirmation  hearings  on Judge  Samuel Alito's
nomination  to  the  Supreme  Court,  Senator  Dick  Durbin  tried  to
make the point:
The  reason  I asked  you  about  [Brown v.  Board of Education and  Roe  v.
Wade]  is  that neither of those  cases referred  to  explicit  language  in  the
Constitution.  Those cases were  based on concepts of equality and liberty
within our Constitution, and the Griswold case took that concept of liberty
and  said  it  means  privacy,  though  the word  is not  in  our  Constitution,
and  the  Brown  v.  Board of Education case  took  the  concept  of equality,
equal  protection, and said,  that means public education  will  not be seg-
41 regated.
Judge  Alito  responded  with  an  extended  description  of  Brown  v.
Board of Education, in  the  course  of which  he  said  that  Brown was
"based squarely on the language of the Equal Protection  Clause," and
the "magnificent principle" of equality.4
'  The precise content of that
principle, though, surely is not set out in the words "equal protection
of the  laws. 43  To  make  the obvious  points:  Judge  Alito  said,  "the
principle that was finally recognized  in Brown v. Board of Education, af-
ter nearly a century of misapplication  of the Fourteenth Amendment,
is  that  denying people  the  opportunity, people  of a particular  race
the  opportunity to attend schools, or for that matter, to make  use  of
other public facilities  that are open to people of a different race,  de-
nies  them  equality."
4"  As  a  critic  of Brown might have  said, you can
look at the words  "equal protection  of the  laws"  as  hard as you  can,
and you are not going to find  that principle enumerated in  the  text.
You are not even going to find a principle of racial  equality "squarely"
in "the language  of the Equal Protection  Clause. ''   To get from that
clause  to the result in  Brown, you have  to do some legal  analysis,  the
effect of which  is to lead  the  courts  to enforce  a right specified at a
level on which it cannot be said that the right is an enumerated one.6
That is one of the things John Marshall  meant in writing, "[W]e  must never forget, that it
is  a constitution we  are  expounding."  McCulloch  v.  Maryland,  17  U.S.  (4  Wheat.)  316,  407
(1819).
41 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A.  Alito, Jr.  to  be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearing  Before the S.  Comm.  on the Judiciary, 109th  Cong. 452
(2006)  [hereinafter  Confirmation  Hearing] (statement of Sen. Durbin).
42  Id. at 453 (statement of then-Judge Alito).
43  U.S. CONST.  amend. XIV, § 1, cl.  4.
Confirmation  Hearing,  supra note 41,  at 453.
45 Id.
46  One of the more  amusing examples of describing specific  constitutional  principles as  ex-
pressly set out in  the Constitution  is the  claim that race-based  affirmative action  programs  are
made unconstitutional  by the plain language  of the Equal Protection  Clause.  They may be  un-
constitutional, but if so it is not because  they violate  a right whose  content is given  by the Con-
stitution's text alone.
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All  constitutional  rights  are equally  enumerated  and  unenumer-
ated.  I know of no metric that would allow us to say that the distance
between the word  liberty and the rights protected in Roe and Lawrence
is  any greater  than the  distance  between  the  words freedom  of speech
and  the  rights  protected  in  the  flag-burning  cases  or  the  nude-
dancing cases or, indeed, the  seditious-speech  cases.  We  have  to do
legal analysis  that goes beyond the text, and  even beyond the under-
standings  at  the  time  the  relevant  constitutional  provisions  were
adopted, with respect to all of them.
We  now  have  a second  reason  that unenumerated  rights  cannot
drift.  The  category,  including  as  it  does  either  all  constitutional
rights or none,  has either too much or too little content for us to ob-
serve  drift.  Still,  as  I noted  at the  outset, there  seems  to  be  some
sense  that something  like drift seems  to occur.  I turn to an examina-
tion of how that sense might arise.
III.  THE POLITICAL VALENCE  OF UNENUMERATED  RIGHTS
We  can  begin  this  examination  by  returning  to  the  use  of the
phrase  unenumerated right  as a term of abuse and opprobrium.  I have
argued  that it is available  to everyone for this purpose.  Its recent his-
tory is that conservatives first deployed  it in  this way, and liberals  re-
sponded either with a freestanding use of the  term or  (probably less
effectively)  in the  tu quoque form.
4
F  I suggest two  mechanisms  associ-
ated with the prevalence  of the use of the  phrase as a term  of oppro-
brium:  denial and  opportunism.  The  basic  idea  is that the  term  is
used as a way of suggesting without arguing that the  toolkit of "stan-
dard legal  methods"  is, or should be, smaller  than it has been.  It is
only because  the toolkit is so large that any right can be described  as
enumerated  (because  connected by standard  legal methods  to text).
Restrict  the  permissible  methods,  and  the  term  unenumerated rights
becomes intelligible.
*  Denial:  "The rights you like are  truly unenumerated;  the ones
we  like  are  tied  (closely  enough)  to  constitutional  text, and  so  are
enumerated."  The  question about denial  is,  how  can it work given
that, as  I have  argued, all  rights are equally tied-closely or loosely-
to constitutional  text?  I believe  that the answer  is that the  person in
denial actually has an implicit constitutional  theory that explains why
the  rights  he  or  she likes  are  closely enough  tied  to  the  text  as  to
47 I do not mean to deny that sometimes one has to do "more" work to defend the claim that
a constitutional right  is violated, or even implicated, than at other times.  My claim is only that
the  distinction between  enumerated  and unenumerated  rights  does not  track  the distinction
between "less" and "more" work.
48 That is, how can you criticize us for liking unenumerated  rights when  you do too?
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count as  enumerated, and why the  opponent's rights  are  not closely
enough  tied to  text.  Why, then, doesn't the argument  take the form
of a defense of that implicit constitutional theory?  I think the answer
is  something  like  this:  The  person  in denial  knows  or suspects  that
the  implicit  constitutional  theory,  and  particularly  the  implicit  ac-
count of "closely-enough linked," could  not stand up to  critical scru-
4') tiny.  In addition, he or she believes, probably accurately,  that his or
her own demand  to know where the opponent's theory is in  the Con-
stitution  will force the opponent to mount a  (necessarily)  ineffective
defense,  thereby obviating  the  need for a defense  of the  critic's own
constitutional theory. 50
*  Opportunism:  "Good unenumerated rights are good, bad ones
aren't."  The speaker understands  that the  critical  references  to  un-
enumerated  rights are simply surrogates for underlying value  or pol-
icy judgments,  but believes  that  making such  references  happens  at
the moment to weaken support for the bad rights.  As Balkin pointed
out, there is  nothing  intrinsically  bothersome  about  this kind of op-
portunism in  political discourse.  Indeed, it might be  its most char-
acteristic feature.  Put another way:  when we  talk about political dis-
course,  saying  that  someone  is  being  opportunistic  is  simply
descriptive, not critical.
Note,  though, that we can shift our attention to opportunism  as  it
operates on a higher level.  That is, so far I have  been describing  the
use  of the phrase  unenumerated rights as a  term  of opprobrium.  But
there is nothing inherent in the phrase that makes it so.  Indeed, one
can imagine  circumstances  in which  the fact that a right was unenu-
merated was an argument in favor of enforcing  it.  So, for example, we
might think that some  rights were  so important at the time the  Con-
stitution  was  written-was  made  text-that  it  literally  went  without
saying'that the Constitution  protected  those rights. 
52  Unenumerated
49  Or that, though  the theory  might be ably defended  by someone  more  skilled than  he  or
she, the person in denial lacks the ability to do so effectively.
50  I suspect that metaphors of visibility matter here, and that some cognitive  psychologist has
shown  that metaphors of visibility are more motivating than metaphors of hearing or speaking.
51  See Balkin,  supra  note  6, at 880-84  (discussing the concept of "theoretical opportunism" in
political debate).
5'  'Ae  can see echoes of this argument in the invocation of constitutional presuppositions in
the Court's state  immunity cases,  see supra notes 31-33 and surrounding text, in contemporary
arguments for judicial  review  of congressional  legislation,  see, e.g.,  Barbara Aronstein  Black,  An
Astonishing Political  Innovation:  The Origins  ofJudicial Review, 49  U. PIT.  L.  REV.  691,  696 (1988)
("Does  this  mean,  ipso  facto, judicial  review?  I think  so ....  Indeed  the  Framers  manifestly
thought it,  as do I, obvious enough to go without saying."),  and in  some  arguments about the
meaning  of the  Ninth  Amendment,  see,  e.g.,  Sanford  Levinson,  Constitutional  Rhetoric and the
Ninth Amendment, 64  CHI.-KENT  L. REv.  131,  144  (1988)  (proposing that Justice Chase failed to
cite  the Ninth Amendment  in Calder v.  Bull, 3  U.S.  (3  Dall.)  386  (1798),  because  it "went with-
out saying" that it was the source of the unenumerated rights involved  in  the case).
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rights might be  those  that are central  to  national  identity, protected
not by specific constitutional  text (or in ways only loosely tied to con-
stitutional text) but by the genius of the nation's people. 3
So,  it seems,  we  have  a series  of negative  results:  no  abstractly-
stated  enumerated  constitutional  right has  any  general  political  va-
lence,  nor does  any  abstractly-stated  unenumerated  right, nor  does
the  entire  category  of unenumerated  rights.  And  yet,  and  yet-
people  do seem  to  be doing something  when  they  describe  a  right
they like or loath as unenumerated.  How can that be?
At this point, I think, the right course would  be to  move  into po-
litical history,  to track the  changing political valences associated,  not
analytically,  but in  real-world  political  discourse  with  the idea of un-
enumerated  rights.  The  reason  the  category  unenumerated rights
seems worth  talking  about at  this  moment  may be  that we  are  at a
point of transition in  that valence,  so that  the fact that  the category
has no inherent political valence  forces  itself into our  awareness.  A
decade  ago everyone  knew that unenumerated  rights were  things lib-
erals loved.  A decade hence,  perhaps, everyone  will  know that those
rights  are  things  conservatives  love.  At  that  time,  the  essays  in this
Symposium  might serve  as  reminders  of an awareness  that has  since
disappeared-and  this  particular  essay  will  seem  peculiarly  out-of-
date.
53 And invocation  of "who we are as a people"-what Philip Bobbitt called  ethical argument-
is  a  standard  legal  method.  PHILIP  BOBBIrF,  CONSTITUTIONAL  FATE:  THEORY  OF  THE
CONSTITUTION  94 (1982)  (defining an "ethical argument" as one "whose force  relies on a char-
acterization of American  institutions and the role within them of the American people.  It is the
character, or ethos, of the American polity that is advanced  in ethical argument....").
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